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1. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan 
The creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947 was the result of the irresistible 
and massive pressure of Muslim nationalism. The British colonial govern-
ment, despite its initial reservations on the practicability and soundness of 
the demand, came around to the viewpoint of the Muslims and agreed to 
partition India. The Pakistan that came into being had two geographical 
units separated by 1,600 miles ofIndian territory. The Eastern Wing became 
the independent Republic of Bangladesh at the end of 1971. Pakistan now 
comprises the West Wing of the Pakistan created in 1947. 
The territory of Pakistan now covers 796,095 square kilometres. It 
borders on Iran to the southwest, Afghanistan to the northwest and India 
to the east. The southern border is the coast of the Arabian Sea. In 19~1, the 
estimated population was 83.78 million. J This population is predominantly 
Muslim. 
Punjab Province 
Punjab is one of the four provinces of Pakistan and is located in the 
northeastern part of the country. It is, on more than one account, the 
country's most important province. It covers 205,345 square kilometres, 
which is 25.79% of the territory of Pakistan.2 It is populated by 47.11 
million people, who comprised more than 56% of the estimated national 
population in 198}.3 The population density is 229 persons per square 
kilometre, while the national average density is 105.4 
The vast amount of agricultural land in Punjab continued to attract 
and support new settlements until well into the 1950s. It is also important to 
note that in 1979-80, 12.61 million of Pakistan's 18.8 million cropped 
hectares were in Punjab. This alone explains the importance of the 
province to Pakistan, which leans heavily on its agricultural sector. In 
1980-81, this sector contributed 29.36% to the GNP.5 
Clearly, Punjab is an exceptional province and deserves the distinction 
of being the most important one to the national economy. Its population 
is the largest of all the provinces and other administrative territories, 
its contribution to GNP is by far the largest, and it has traditionally played 
a pioneering role in many areas of national development, including the 
establishment of cooperatives. 
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The Subject 
The British government in India, as in the other British colonies, tried to 
popularise the cooperative movement. The reasons for selecting this policy 
will be explained later. Initially, one important objective of the coopera-
tives was the expansion of rural credit and the channelling of rural savings 
for agricultural- and hence rural- development. From 1904 onwards, an 
elaborate system of cooperative banking had grown which functioned 
despite limited and more general crises in the country before and after 
independence. 
In 1976 the government of Pakistan introduced fundamental changes 
in the system. It established a Federal Bank for Cooperatives and thus 
brought cooperative fmance under direct federal control for the fIrst time. 
My purpose in this paper is to study these changes and how they have 
affected rural cooperatives in Punjab. The reason for highlighting the 
importance of Punjab province is, primarily, to show that this case study is 
important enough to be ascribed wider validity that goes beyond provincial 
boundaries. Because the sample is so large and vital to the total context, 
such a general observation is difficult to resist. 
This paper is also intended to evaluate the impression that attaining 
direct federal control over cooperative fmance was motivated by one or 
more of the following: 
(a) predominantly political considerations which disregarded the adverse 
effects of taking control over the cooperative institutions and over the 
movement; 
(b) the desire to assume direct authority over finance available in the 
cooperative sector of the economy, in order to transfer the large resources 
held by the Punjab cooperatives to other provinces, notably Sind; 
(c) a desire to wrest control over cooperative fmance from the traditional 
rural elite and to create a new elite by exercising patronage; and 
(d) a straightforward desire to strengthen and intensify the developmental 
role of cooperative fmance. 
This paper does not aim to study or analyse class and power structures 
in rural Pakistan. Such an undertaking is. too large to be treated adequately 
in a paper of this size, which in any case is devoted to another endeavour, 
albeit closely related. Only general references shall be made to the class and 
power structure in order to explain a phenomenon or strengthen an 
argument, or when this is only possible in such terms. 
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The aim is also not to study the role of cooperatives in rural develop-
ment, since the paper considers another dimension. It addresses itself to the 
overpowering influence of administrative considerations which result in 
the bureaucratic take-over of what were originally conceived as 'popular' 
socio-economic institutions. It also addresses itself to the subordination of 
these to the overriding political interests and the consequent replication of 
the class and power structures in the character of these institutions. 
In concluding this introduction, a few words should be said about the 
data. There is little published literature on cooperative institutions in 
Pakistan covering the years since the early 1950s. One therefore has to rely 
in part on accounts of the experiences of those who have worked closely 
and directly with these .institutions. I have kept in mind that this reliance 
should not be absolute but corroborative and explanatory, and it is there-
fore both cautious and discrete. 
2. RURAL INDEBTEDNESS: THE REASON FOR ESTABLISHING AND 
STRUCTURING COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES 
The extent of rural indebtedness, as well as its destructive effects on 
agricultural production and on Indian rural society, were the subjects of 
numerous British government studies in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Some of these studies are referred to here; others are 
not mentioned either because they are not available or because they do not 
deal essentially with rural indebtedness or do so only indirectly. 
The grave situation created by the disastrous extent of rural indebted-
ness attracted the attention of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in 
India in 1927 and of the Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee in 
1929. The British government thus had a fair appreciation of the informal 
institutions for rural credit, the propensity of and need for agriculturists to 
get into debt and the usurious nature of private credit (i.e. the hardship 
involved in repaying it and in collecting it), as well as the harshness of its 
effects on indebted households, agricultural production and rural society. 
Sir Malcolm Darling of the Indian Civil Service brought out a monu-
mental book entitled The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt in 1925, 
which is perhaps the fIrst knowledgeable analysis of the precarious exist-
ence of small agriculturists in Punjab under British rule. In analysing 
the 'why' and 'how' of rural indebtedness Sir Malcolm wrote: 
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There are four main reasons why the peasant proprietor is obliged to borrow: 
- The small size of his holding and the way it is split up, conditions which make it almost 
impossible for him to live without getting into debt, unless he is exceptionally frugal and 
industrious, or has some extraneous source of income. 
-His coiistiintl:VrecuiTing los-seso(cahlefrorii-drought and dlsease. 
- His ingrained improvidence, the effects Qfwhich are greatly aggravated by insecurity of 
crop. 
- His extravagant expenditure upon marriage and other domestic ceremonies. 
In addition there are two other causes, that make borrowing easy, namely: 
- The money-lender and his vicious system of business. The great expansion of credit due 
to high prices and the inflated value of land. 
The first four cases explain why the peasant proprietor must borrow, the last two how he 
can borrow, and it is the combination of 'must' and 'can' that explains the great increase 
in debt in the last fifty years. Or, expressing it differently, we may say that the first four 
causes explain the existence of debt, the money-lender and his system, its continuance 
and the expansion of credit and its volume.6 
In doing research, rural credit is classified as long-term, medium-term 
and short-term. While the purposes for which each of these kinds of credit 
are used may and frequently do - vary, another distinction is more 
important: credit may be obtained for productive or non-productive 
purposes. It is the near absence of formal sources of agricultural credit and 
the seemingly convenient facility offered by the money-lender tha(draws 
the agriculturist into a vicious economic trap from which he cannot 
extricate himself. Even his heirs [md themselves starting their agricultural 
careers with the burden of ancestral debts. The uncertain nature of 
agriculture, the rigid and inflexible demand of government dues, the 
demands of an inelastic and custom-ridden rural society, the adverse terms 
of trade for agricultural products (particularly during the Depression 
between the two World Wars) and, compounding all these problems, 
widespread illiteracy contributed to the perpetuation of indebtedness and 
also aggravated it. 7 
In 1932, the Punjab government appointed a 'Committee on Indebted-
ness' (hereafter called the COl) whose specific objective was to study the 
earlier reports and make recommendations on the problem of indebted-
ness. In its report, the COl observed that ' ... the continued fall in the prices 
of agricultural produce has made the pressure of debt on the cultivator 
heavier than it was then and the problem correspondingly more acute'. 8 
The report recognised that the institution of the money-lender could not be 
eliminated and that legislation could at best partially assist in 'controlling' 
and 'regulating' money-lenders to prevent the repetition of the system's 
4 
'worst abuses'.9 It recommended measures strictly within a context where 
there could be 'no question of attempting to stop lending of money to 
impecunious people with little or no security to offer'. 10 
When the COl rounded off its examination of the earlier recommenda-
tions and made its own proposals on how best to provide relief to the 
debt-ridden agriculturists, it observed that 'the Commissions and Com-
mittees whose reports we have been directed to study unanimously re-
commend cooperation as one of the surest remedies, if not the most im-
portant, for indebtedness'. It also stated that 'nothing that can be done 
by Government to encourage thrift should be left undone, since it is 
primarily the lack of that virtue which leads to perpetual need for credit 
among cultivators of this Province, and credit, being almost invariably 
misused, is the fore-runner of chronic indebtedness'. 11 
The COl report made two other important recommendations which 
are both significant and interesting in so far as they looked far into the 
future and are no less valid today. Firstly, it suggested that safeguards 
should be provided against the misuse of cooperative funds by persons with 
influence in managing the cooperatives. Secondly, it highlighted the need 
for 'remunerative occupation as an alternative to or in conjunction with 
agriculture ... ', without which' ... there will be little prospect of permanent 
relief from debt'. 12 
In 1929, the Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee assessed 
the agricultural debt of the province for that year. It came up with a 
staggering figure of Rs 1,350 million. 13 Two factors made this figure even 
more formidable. ;First, there was an identifiable sharp rise in indebtedness: 
between 1921 and 1929 the debt had increased by 50%. This increase was 
found to be related to a sudden rise in the general standard ofliving, falling 
prices of agricultural produce and a number of poor harvests.14 It was 
related to 'excessively wide credit being combined with excessively dear 
money'. 15 
Usurious rates may be rather difficult to define, but the money-lender, 
in order to offset the insecurity of the loans being extended, stepped up the 
interest rates. The borrower was willing to pay these high rates since he was 
aware that he was not eligible to receive credit from formal institutions at 
short notice. While the rates varied from province to province and area to 
area, they were usually around 18Yz% in Punjab, but they were consider-
ably higher if the loan was not adequately secure. 16 
The situation as it was in 1929 had developed in a gradual manner and 
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had not escaped the notice of the government. However, the measures 
initiated by the government to release the agriculturist from the strangu-
lating grip of the money-lender took time to take effect. During this period, 
the population increased faster than was estimated; the standard ·of living 
rose, and prices of agricultural products fell while the operations of 
commercial banks in rural areas were limited. . 
The Enquiry Committee found that among all the sources of credit -
i.e. money-lenders, agriculturists, the government, the commercial banks 
and friends or relatives - the banks played a 'negligible' role.!? This was 
because the small land-owners' operations were too small to be handled, 
and the larger operations were too risky in view of the Land Alienation 
Act, which restricted the transfer of secured land to non-agricultural castes. 
The most important source, according to the Committee, was the village 
money-lender, while the agriculturists with large land holdings were 
quickly beginning to assume the money-lender's role and combine it with 
their other activities. 
The Beginning of the Cooperative Movement 
The cooperative movement started to receive government sponsorship 
around the close of the nineteenth century. Rather than explaining the his-
tory of indigenous cooperation as it existed before British rule or before 
1904, this paper will study the cooperatives in their more recent form. It 
will, therefore, not be necessary here to go far back into Indian history. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the institution of the money-
lender had apparently reduced the agriculturist, especially the small one, 
to crippling economic dependence. Because of the positive experience in 
Europe with cooperatives, they were strongly recommended as the remedy 
for the Indian situation, as was highlighted by the official enquiries 
mentioned above (despite the dissimilarity between the two situations). 
The work ~f the Committee on Cooperation in India, which was 
appointed in 1915, should be mentioned here because it represents perhaps 
the most authoritative official government view on the beginning of the 
Indian cooperative movement. The official view is important because the 
governments in India before independence and in ·Pakistan thereafter have 
sponsored and regulated the cooperatives very closely from the start to the 
present time. In 1897 and 1899, Sir Frederick Nicholson presented to the 
Madras government his reports on how the system of agricultural and land 
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banks existing in Europe could be extended to India. In 1900, similar 
studies were made in the United Provinces. The earliest cooperative 
societies were established under the Companies Act of 1882, but this Act 
soon proved unsuitable for the type of societies that were to be organised 
and developed. Special legislation therefore had to be enacted, and in 1904 
the Cooperative Credit Societies Act was promulgated. 18 
It is interesting to note that the fIrst legislation on cooperatives 
provided for the establishment of 'credit societies'. This fact makes it clear 
that credit disbursement (and hence the generation of savings) was the 
most important - if not the only - pressing need which the cooperatives 
were originally intended to satisfy. 
The provincial governments took steps to realise the intentions of the 
federal law. Although differences in local conditions led to various types of 
societies and different forms of growth, nowhere 'did the new doctrine fail 
to strike root' .19 The report of the Committee provides fIgures, shown in 
Table 1, on the growth in number of cooperatives between 1906 and 1912. 
Table 1. Growth of the Cooperative Movement in India: 1906-12* 
Year No. of No. of Amount of working 
societies members capital (in Rs) 
1906-07 853 90,844 2,371,683 
1907-08 1,357 149,160 4,414,083 
1908-09 1,963 180,338 8,232,225 
1909-10 3,428 224,397 12,408,312 
1910-11 5,321 305,058 23,305,500 
1911-12 8,177 403,318 ·33,574,162 
* These are the figures for all of India. The first year excludes information on the Indian 
Princely States. Capital lent and borrowed between societies has been shown twice in the 
last column. 
Source: Report . .. Committee on Cooperation . .. , p. 4. 
The speed with which the credit societies proliferated indicates the need 
that these apparently fulfilled. The beginning was modest, but the general 
trends were encouraging. It was in 1927 that Sir Malcolm Darling, at that 
time Commissioner of Income Tax for Punjab, stated (in his evidence 
before the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India) that his department 
had observed that the 'Professional money-lender is gradually reducing his 
business in the village'.20 He considered 'the rapid growth of cooperative 
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credit societies'21 as one of the obvious reasons for this. The expansion of 
credit and the reasons for this is a large subject in itself: it should therefore 
suffice to say here that credit expanded at a fast rate, and the professional 
money-lender found that hewas no longer practically the only source of 
rural credit (the foremost competitor being the larger land-owners them-
selves, followed by the cooperative credit societies). 
In 1912, the original Cooperative Credit Societies Act was replaced by 
new legislation which provided for: 
(a) non-credit cooperative societies which could not be organised under 
1904 law, since the latter only provided for credit societies; and 
(b) higher tiers of cooperative credit societies (i.e. the Central Cooperative 
Banks and central banking unions, the latter of which were functioning 
without any legal provisions and were needed to supervise, fmance and 
control the original credit societies).22 
In Punjab, the movement was a little slower in expanding than in 
certain other parts of India, notably Madras and Bombay. The money-
lender was well entrenched and clearly saw the new challenge. In 1912, there 
were 1,749 societies in Punjab, their total menbership being 93,169 with 
a working capital ofRs 7.3 million. These figures do not, however, tell the 
whole story. Although all twenty-four districts were covered, in nine of 
these the total number of societies was less than ten.23 During the First 
World War, when prices of agricultural products increased and the money-
lender could develop additional avenues of business, solid government 
support for cooperatives led to their rapid expansion. By 1918, the number 
of societies had increased to 4,028, and their total membership was 135,027 
and working capital was Rs 19.7 million.24 
At the end of the First World War, the return of the demobilised 
soldiers to the villages created a climate favourable to the cooperative 
movement. Liberal ideas, the desire for a better standard of living and 
resistance to exploitation were demonstrated by the soldiers who had 
served abroad. The Punjab Usurious Act of 1918 also placed severe 
restrictions on the money-lenders' opportunities to exploit the agricul-
turists. Between 1919 and 1929, the movement expanded and grew as never 
before in the Punjab.2s 
During the Depression in the 1930s, the recovery of debts due to 
money-lenders led to even more hardships for the agriculturalists. The 
government introduced legislation to protect them, but since this was also 
applicable to the recovery of debts due to cooperative credit societies, 
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the rate of recovery for cooperative dues fell to as low as 13.6%.26 
During the Second World War, the cooperatives took on a new and 
important role. The government entrusted the movement with the tasks of 
purchasing wheat and wholesaling sugar, kerosene oil, salt and cloth. For 
the government, the idea was to use a reliable trading agency that would 
not aggravate or misuse the crises, while for the cooperatives this arrange-
ment yielded large and reliable profits. The Central Cooperative Banks 
found these operations far more lucrative than rural credit operations. 
Thus it was not surprising that the financial institutions of the movement 
emphasised this more profitable field of operation.27 
At the time of independence (1947), the Indian Punjab - which became 
part of Pakistan - had an elaborate network of cooperative institutions, as 
is shown by Table 2. This table also shows the situation seven years later. 
Table 2. Growth of the Cooperative Movement in Punjab after Independence, 1947-54 
Type of Year No. of No. of Working capital 
societies societies members (in Rs) 
Provincial 1947 11,210 40.1 million 
banks 1954 10,937 61.9 million 
Central cooper-
ative credit 1947 50 11,724 61.9 million 
societieslbanks 1954 61 14,893 129.4 million 
Agricultural 1947 9,920 315,081 25.2 million 
societies 1951 11,096 401,765 48.3 million 
Source: The Cooperative Enquiry Committee Report, pp. 13 and 18. 
Non-Muslims had dominated trade, industry, commerce and banking 
in the Indian Punjab. When they migrated to India at the time of 
independence, they left a vacuum that Pakistan was hard pressed to fill. 
The cooperative infrastructure was chosen to fill the void. The societies and 
banks handled the purchasing of food grains and husking of rice; the 
purchasing and ginning of cotton, and the import and wholesaling of cloth 
on behalf of the government. These were, however, only some of the 
functions undertaken by cooperatives in the crisis situation: they also 
helped with initial industrialisation and set up Pakistan's first textile, wool 
and sugar industries.28 
The profits from these new operations were sizeable, but vital damage 
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was being done in disguise. Amidst the eagerness to undertake these new 
profitable ventures, cooperative principles were set aside. The operations 
of the Central Cooperative Banks became very widely extended, but their I 
dealings were mainly with individuals arid, woise lhari that, with nori-
members. Trained personnel in the cooperatives began to operate the new 
ventures, thus leaving a void that was fIlled by quasi-trained staff.29 In 1955 
the report of the Cooperative Enquiry Committee concluded that 'while 
the new undertakings helped in restoration of trade and commerce in the 
country, these not only caused a very heavy strain on the already depleted 
resources of the Department but also turned their attention from the rural 
to the commercial side'. 30 
The Structure of Cooperative Banking 
The cooperative movement was initiated in 1904 'with the express object 
of supplying credit to rural masses at a reasonable rate of interest'31 and 
to promote thrift. These agricultural cooperative credit societies func-
tioned as 'elementary banks in the sense that these received deposits, 
advanced loans and opened accounts for their members'. 32 In the course of 
time, some of these primary societies accumulated more deposits than 
could be gainfully utilised, while others were short of deposits. As the 
number of societies grew, it became quite impossible for the government to 
operate a system for transferring resources from the richer societies to the 
poorer ones. It was also seen that the Joint Stock Banks were reluctant to 
advance money to the societies. Secondary cooperative societies therefore 
had to be created to meet the credit requirements of needy primary 
societies. 
Ordinarily, membership in the secondary societies would have been 
confined to primary societies. (This was the case only for cooperative 
banking unions which had small areas of operation.) The Central Cooper-
ative Banks were meant to provide credit to primary societies either in a 
district or a tehsil (an administrative unit of which there are about four to a 
district). These Banks pursued a policy of selectively admitting individual 
members, primarily with the object of attracting deposits.33 
It soon became necessary to establish a balance between the Central 
Cooperative Banks with a surplus and those with a deficit. To do this, a 
third tier was added to the banking structure in 1924. The Punjab Provincial 
Cooperative Bank was created as the 'apex fmancial institution which 
10 
could coordinate the fmances of secondary institutions, receive surplus 
funds from certain central banks and advance loans to those which needed 
fmancial assistance'.34 In addition to the secondary societies (i.e. the 
Central Cooperative Banks and banking unions), certain primary societies 
also became affiliates of the Punjab Provincial Bank. 
One other kind of cooperative financial institution was the mortgage 
bank. Experience with the performance of these varied from province to 
province. These banks provided long-term loans for redeeming mortgages, 
improving land and methods of cultivation, liquidating old debts and 
purchasing land in special cases.35 In the Punjab, some of the mortgage 
banks relied on their own resources, while others drew on the Central 
Cooperative Banks, as did the ordinary primary societies. The mortgage 
banks had only a fractional impact on total cooperative finance in the 
Province. 
This three-tier cooperative banking structure functioned to balance out 
the varying needs and capabilities of the affIliated primary and secondary 
societies and operated as such until 1976. This simple system, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1, was arranged in a loose hierarchical order with each 
tier depending and drawing upon the others to the extent that it needed to 
and the others could accommodate. There were no elements of regulation 
or control, and in a sense each tier was autonomous. 
The internal structure of the primary, secondary and apex coopera-
tive societies was essentially similar in so far as these had very widely 
based electorates for choosing their managing committees. All these tiers 
functioned under the Cooperative Societies Act of 1925, which was a 
modified version of the 1912 legislation mentioned earlier. The 1912 
legislation was repealed by the 1925 law, but a number of its aspects were 
maintained by Section 72 of the 1925 law for the societies already existing 
under the repealed law. Both the law and the regulations emanating from it 
were revised and amended from time to time, but the basic structure 
remained essentially unchanged. 
All the cooperative societies were (and still are) required to be 
registered with the Registrar, who was the principal provincial government 
officer assigned the responsibility of developing, supervising and regulating 
cooperatives in a given province. He was (and is) the head of the 
bureaucracy dealing with cooperatives and was able to exercise vast powers 
under the laws on cooperatives. 
At the time of its application for registration, each society was required 
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Figure 1. The Three-Tier Cooperative Banking Structure in Pakistan as it. Existed until 
19 October 1976 
to submit a copy of its proposed Rules of Business (i.e. its bye-laws) to the 
Registrar. These had to be in line with the government's laws, niles and 
general policies for cooperatives. Although each cooperative society was 
free to frame its own rules within these broad limits, they generally drew 
upon standard guidelines. In the primary societies, the managing com-
mittees are elected directly. The committee members hold office for a 
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specified period of time and are responsible for running the society in 
accordance with the objectives set out in its bye-laws. 
In order to understand how the secondary societies functioned, the 
constitution of one of them - the Central Cooperative Bank in Lahore -
will be discussed here (this bank was dissolved in 1976). The Bank's 
functioning was broadly typical of similar secondary societies. Each 
member had one vote in the general meeting of the Bank, and the 
membership was open to all registered cooperative societies in the area of 
operation of the Bank, those individuals who sponsored the Bank at the 
time of its registration, and all other individuals who were approved for 
admission as members by the managing committee of the Bank. All 
members were required to have a financial interest in the Bank equivalent 
to at least one share. In 1961 the value of each share was Rs 25.36 
Given what is to be discussed later in this paper, two important aspects 
of banking operations deserve mention here. First, the objectives of the 
Central Cooperative Bank in Lahore will be considered; second, some 
functions of its managing committee will be explained. The performance of 
a Central Cooperative Bank can be best evaluated by referring to these two 
functions. The objectives listed in the Bank's constitution were: to facilitate 
the operations of registered cooperative societies; to advance loans to 
individual members for 'necessary purposes', subject to certain limits; and 
to grant loans to non-members on certain specified terms and conditions. 37 
Its objectives also included supervising and auditing registered cooperative 
societies which had financial dealings with the Bank; providing education 
about cooperative activities to members of such societies; and taking 'other 
measures designed to improve the work and extend usefulness of such 
societies'.38 
The functions of the managing committee of the Central Cooperative 
Bank in Lahore included examining the maximum credit limit fixed for 
each cooperative society by the Registrar or his subordinate officials, and 
the committee could reduce this limit but could not raise it. It could also 
determine the conditions on which loans were advanced to individual 
shareholders. It had the power to decide on the repayment periods for 
loans and their interest rates and to arrange for the recovery of loans and 
interest.39 Within the limits of its bye-laws and those prescribed by the 
Registrar, the Bank had a fair degree of operational independence. 
The Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank was established in 1924.40 Its 
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objectives were largely the same vis-a-vis the secondary cooperative socie-
ties (and also vis-a-vis some primary societies which became directly 
affIliated to it) as were the objectives of the Central Cooperative Banks 
vis-a':vis the pri.mary societies~ In addition, it aimed to acras a 'balancing 
centre', in financial terms, for the cooperatives in the province.41 The 
functions of its executive committee, which sat for a term of three years, 
were essentially the same as those of the managing committees of the 
Central Cooperative Banks.42 
The regulations for membership of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative 
Bank and its executive committee differed from those of the Central 
Cooperative Banks. Membership of the former was open to all cooperative 
societies in the province which owned at least one share of the Provincial 
Bank. The Registrar and Chief Auditor of Cooperatives in Punjab pro-
vince, as representatives of the government, were on the executive 
committee by virtue of the offices they held.43 The Registrar was the ex 
officio President of the Bank. He presided over the general meeting of the 
Provincial Bank and over its executive committee.44 
The general meeting of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank 
included all ex officio and appointed members and the members repre-
senting the cooperative societies, who were elected at the district meet-
ingS.45 Thus there was an element of indirect representation. Meetings of all 
the member cooperative societies in each district were convened to elect 
delegates for the general meeting of the Provincial Bank. One delegate was 
elected for every fifty member societies or less.46 The general meeting 
elected the members of the executive committee (one for each district), 
discussed the fmancial situation of the Bank and declared dividends, 
received and considered the audit reports.47 The important powers of 
approving the budget and fixing a maximum limit on liabilities that could 
be incurred during the next year could be exercised by the general meeting 
only with the approval of the Registrar. 
The most significant aspect that demands emphasis here is the provin-
cial government's direct control over the Punjab Provincial Bank through 
its President and appointed members. The provincial government, through 
the Registrar, exercised extensive powers to control and regulate all types 
of societies, including the Provincial Cooperative Bank. This is in line with 
the original thinking of the British government at the time when the 
cooperative system was initiated. While the British ruled India, they always 
placed very strong emphasis on government sponsorship of the cooper-
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atives - without which, it was felt, these would fail to grow and would 
be stunted by individual interests and personal motivations. 
E.M. Hough made a scholarly study of cooperatives in India in 1950. 
He wrote that: 
official nurture is not the ideal method of sustaining a cooperative movement, but in the 
Indian context the choice was, as it has been largely ever since, between a government 
initiated and government fostered effort and leaving the impoverished and often apathetic 
people without the alleviation of the wretchedness which most agree, cooperation can bring 
about. What has, however, been imperfectly realised in general is the vast ~sponsibility 
which the underwriting of the cooperative effort involved and implied. T~ere was no 
overpowering obligation to start the movement in the absence of full conviction as to its 
possibilities but, having started it, there was, and is, an inescapable moral responsibility for 
its development on sound lines. That the responsibility has been discharged w'ith varying 
degrees of inadequacy must be apparent to any serious student of the movement. 48 
This extract admirably sums up the situation. That the movement was 
neither spontaneous nor popularly launched should be all too obvious 
from the discussion so far. However, it would not be entirely correct to 
think that the British government had many alternatives to establishing 
cooperatives in 1904. The problem of rural indebtedness and of its effects 
on agriCUlture and on rural society meant that the British government 
could do little else. As was already mentioned, the numerous government 
enquiries had concluded that cooperatives were the single most important 
solution to the problem. Cooperatives thus became a development-
oriented relief programme initiated by the government. The will of govern-
ment officials to effectively develop cooperative efforts need not be 
doubted here, but it seems that while government officials created the 
societies, they did little in terms of creating a genuinely popular movement. 
Yet the number of societies, the memberships, the amount of cooperative 
funds and the cooperative network continued to expand, and that process 
is continuing even now. Such a situation might seem to be inherently 
inconsistent, but hopefully further discussion will shed some light on this 
point. 
In closing this section, it should be pointed out that cooperative efforts in 
the informal sector have deliberately been kept outside the purview of this 
discussion. Apart from the fact that such efforts generally remained at a 
low level, they also remained confuied to dealings with informal 
and non-government sources of fmance. At best, cooperative banking 
could deal with these informal and unregistered societies as they 
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did with individuals, because these societies were not provided for in the 
cooperative laws. 
3. THE FEDERALISATION OF COOPERATIVE BANKING 
The adoption of the concept of cooperation as a government policy and the 
background to that decision was briefly reviewed in the previous section. 
The growth in cooperative activities from 1904 to 1976 was described, and 
in so doing it was shown that fIrst the British and subsequently the Pakistan 
governments tended to use the cooperative infrastructure to implement 
some of their new programmes and also to perform some of their routine 
operations. It was also emphasised that the cooperative institutions which 
provided fmance took on new, but not strictly cooperative, functions. The 
most important point, however, was that the government had direct 
control over each tier of the three-tier banking system. 
It was within this setting that on 9 October 1976, the President of 
Pakistan, Mr ZulfIqar Ali Bhutto, promulgated Presidential Ordinance No. 
XL to federalise cooperative banking. (An ordinance, rather than some 
other form of legislation, was found necessary because the National 
Assembly was not in session, and the President was 'satisfIed that circum-
stances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action', as was 
stated in the Preamble of the Ordinance.) Although cooperative activities 
were supposed to be dealt with by the provincial governments under the 
1973 Constitution, the provincial assemblies had previously passed resolu-
tions authorising the Federal Parliament to legislate on and regulate cooper-
ative banking (as the Preamble of the Ordinance also stated). 
The Ordinance made legal provision for the following: 
(a) establishment of a corporation to be called 'the Federal Bank for 
Cooperatives';49 
(b) subscription to the share capital of the new Federal Bank exclusively 
and entirely by the government, i.e. by the federal government, the State 
Bank and the four provincial governments;50 
(c) reorganisation ofthe Provincial Cooperative Banks;51 and 
(d) dissolution of the secondary cooperative credit societies (i.e. the Cen-
tral Cooperative Banks and the Banking Unions) and provision for their 
undertakings to be transferred to and vested in the provincial cooperative 
bank of the province within which such cooperative banks are registered. 52 
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Before describing the circumstances which led to Iederalisation and the 
manner in which the new law was enforced, a few words should be said 
about the new cooperative banking structure. This sequence of description 
is preferred, because an explanation of the new organisational set-up will 
hopefully help in gaining a better understanding of the old one and of the 
motivations for changing it (see points [a-d] on page 2). 
Under Section 17(2) of the Presidential Ordinance of 1976, which is still 
in effect, the Federal Bank for Cooperatives exercises the powers to: 
(i) 'make secured loans and advances to provincial cooperative banks, 
multi-unit cooperative societies and, subject to the regulations framed for 
the purpose, to the officers and staff of the Bank';53 
(ii) 'assist the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments in 
formulating schemes for development and revitalisation for the cooper-
ative movement in the country in general and the Provincial Cooperative 
Banks in particular';54 
(iii) 'assist provincial cooperative banks in preparing their seasonal and 
developmental loaning programmes and conduct appraisal and undertake 
feasibility study of projects covered by such loaning programroes';55 
(iv) 'encourage the development of special cooperative projects the 
objects or area of operation of which may extend to more than one 
province';56 
(v) 'organise training in cooperation and cooperative banking for the 
employees of the provincial cooperative banks and other cooperative 
societies';57 
(vi) 'ensure proper utilisation of loans obtained from the Bank';58 and 
(vii) 'carry out research on problems of rural credit and on such other 
matters as have a bearing on the development of the cooperative 
movement in the country'. 59 
Besides these important powers, the Federal Bank also has the power 
to inspect the four Provincial Cooperative Banks and to lay down policy 
guidelines and give directives with regard to banking business. It may even 
supercede the Board of Directors of a Provincial Cooperative Bank. Acting 
through the State Bank of Pakistan, the Federal Bank also has the power to 
prohibit a Provincial Cooperative Bank from accepting deposits or to 
restrict the acceptance of deposits when it is felt that a Provincial Cooper-
ative Bank is acting to the detriment of the interests of the public, the 
depositors or itself. 
The composition of the Board of Directors of the Federal Bank ensures 
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that the federal government has a large representation on it. Only five of 
the directors who are appointed to it are not government officials. The 
cooperatives themselves do not elect representatives to the Board (as they 
-do to the Boards bf the Provincial Coopenitive Banks). Thiiteen-of the 
eighteen directors are ex officio: i.e. they include the Governor of the 
State Bank (one member), all the directors of the State Bank (six members), 
the Managing Director of the Federal Bank and one repres(~!1tative of 
the federal Ministry dealing with cooperatives (two more members). 
Two directors are taken from each province, and one of each of these is 
not a government official. The federal government additionally appoints 
one person as director who is also not a government official. Thus the 
breakdown of the Board is as follows:60 
- nine directors holding other official positions within the federal govern-
ment; 
- four directors holding other official positions in the four provincial 
governments; and 
- five directors who hold no official positions in the federal or provincial 
governments but are appointed by the Federal Government either 
directly or on the recommendations of provincial governments. 
The composition of the Board obviously shows the following aspects of 
cooperative activities in Pakistan. 
(a) The government of Pakistan has complete control over the manage-
ment of the Federal Bank. Even in the unlikely event that the four official 
directors from the provinces were to join with the four directors from the 
provinces who are not government officials, the government of Pakistan 
would still be able to put across its views. Such an eventuality is, however, 
quite unlikely, since the provincial viewpoint can only be put forward 
within recognised limits. 
(b) Normally, the five directors who do not hold official positions are 
drawn from among those who are known to be active and prominent in 
cooperative activities. They are in no way dependent upon an electorate of 
members of cooperatives in the provinces by which they are nominated.61 
The fact that they are appointed rather than elected leads them to remain 
independent of the views and pressures from the cooperatives in their 
provinces. 
(c) There is a high level of government influence and 'bureaucratisation' 
at the policy-making level. 
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As was explained in section 1 above, until 9 October 1976 the Provincial 
Cooperative Banks were the apex fmancial institutions in the cooperative 
structure. Since then, this has no longer been the case. In the provinces, the 
Provincial Cooperative Banks are now the upper tier in a two-tier system, 
and all the primary societies deal directly with them. The Provincial Banks 
are now similar to the provincial head offices of any other commercial 
bank operating with a network of branches. The former Central Cooper-
ative Banks and banking unions, which used to be the most important tier 
in cooperative fmance, are now the branches of the Provincial Cooperative 
Banks and have no independent or distinct identity. The local character of 
the Central Cooperative Banks has been lost: their successors-in-interest 
are bank branches which are not familiar with and are cut off from the local 
environment in which banking operations take place. 
In Pakistan before 1976, cooperative banking had a 'two tier system in 
Sind and the Northwestern Frontier Provinces and a three-tier system in 
other areas'. Thus the two-tier cooperative banking system was not new: it 
already existed in two of the four provinces. 'In the two-tier system the 
primary societies were directly affiliated with apex banks, while in the 
three-tier system the apex banks were at the top, the central cooperative 
banks or central multi-purpose societies were in the middle and the 
primary societies at the base. '62 It is, however, not merely the elimination of 
one tier but the effect of this change and the essential characteristics of the 
new structure which provokes both curiosity and interest. 
On 10 July 1982, I was able to have a long and interesting discussion with 
two senior officials in the Cooperatives Department in Punjab province. 
Both of them had been working with cooperatives in Punjab for the last 
thirty years and had held high positions throughout the periods before and 
after federalisation. At the time of the discussion, one of them was a top 
cooperative bureaucrat in the Punjab government; the other was a high 
official in the Federal Bank for Cooperatives. More importantly, however, 
the latter had held a key appointment in cooperatives in Punjab during 
federalisation. The information provided to me was, of course, an account 
of the officials' own personal impressions; nevertheless, it was the actual 
experience of those who participated in decision-making and who were 
exposed to the important 'behind-the-scenes' factors that led to a drastic 
reorganisation of cooperative banking in Pakistan. As was stated in section 
1, one must be cautious about relying on such information, but in a sense it 
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is necessary material for analysing and understanding government data in 
its true perspective. 
During the discussion with these two officials, one could not escape the 
impression-that for them;-federalisation-wasintendedto-and actualIy-tlid 
affect cooperative [mance in Punjab more substantially than in all the other 
provinces. Punjab province was (and still is - see point [b] on page 2) 
considerably more developed in terms of cooperative institutions and 
operations, as is evidenced by the information in Table 3. 
Table 3. A Comparison by Province of the Development of Agricultural Cooperative Socie-
ties Immediately before Federalisation 
1975-76 Punjab Sind NW.F.P.* Baluchistan 
No. of societies 12,579 421 2,672 79 
No.of members 604,000 80,000 116,000 2,000 
Credit (in 79.90 5.15 6.78 negligible 
millions of Rs) 
* Northwestern Frontier Province. 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 1980, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government 
of Pakistan, 1981, p. 137. 
The performance of the Provincial and Central Cooperative Banks in 
other provinces, notably in Sind and Baluchistan, was in marked contrast 
to their performance in Punjab. In comparative terms, however, both the 
performance and impact of the Punjab Central Cooperative Banks on the 
rural economy were far wider and also far deeper. The administrative 
infrastructure in Punjab had also been considerably more developed since 
before independence. The Central Cooperative Banks had been the most 
vital link in the cooperative credit structure before federalisation. 
The two senior officials of the Punjab Cooperatives Department 
observed that the State Bank of Pakistan was exceedingly critical of the 
commercial operations of the Central Cooperative Banks outside the 
cooperative sector. It prescribed restrictions on cooperative credit, but for 
a long time Punjab province resisted the State Bank's attempts to assert its 
authority as the main credit planner for the economy. 
At a later stage, the officials observed, the State Bank managed to 
assert its authority to inspect the Provincial and Central Cooperative 
Banks. This aggravated the situation: ,the State Bank's inspection revealed 
not only that there'were irregularities but also that the commercial opera-
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tions of these banks were not conducted along the secure lines characteristic 
of commercial banking. These banks' hazardously insecure operations 
became the justification for further State Bank intervention. In 1958, 
Punjab had agreed to and asked for the appointment of a Banking Advisor 
from the State Bank. This appointment seems to have generated intense ill 
will, and the hostile atmosphere pre-empted all chances of an objective 
working relationship. The intention here is not to apportion blame for the 
lack of good working relations: this situation is mentioned only because the 
two officers felt very strongly about it. The State Bank had further cause to 
complain when the Banking Advisor was removed from office under rather 
unpleasant circumstances within a year of his appointment. 
A word should be said here about what the two senior officers told me 
about Sind province. Cooperative institutions in Pakistan, and especially 
the Central Cooperative Banks, were the political havens of the influential 
elements in rural society. There was an undefmed but clearly discernable 
connection between large land-owners and control over t~e Central 
Cooperative Banks, and both of these kinds of control opened doors to 
political power. Those ex~rcising this control invariably had political 
ambitions. Cooperative banking gave them avenues to exercise tremen-
dous patronage, which helped in building political careers. In Sind, as in 
Punjab, the Provincial and Central Cooperative Banks were strongholds of 
the rural elite. While it may be true that they did not owe their wealth and 
influence to their control over those banks, the latter tremendously 
strengthened their domination in rural society, which is essentially fac-
tional in composition. 
When Mr Bhutto started his political campaign against the government 
of Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1966, he faced hostility - or at least 
indifference - from the rural elite. In Sind, the province where Mr Bhutto 
owned large estates, he ran into a wall of opposition. His foremost 
opponents and those who supported the government in rural Sind also 
controlled the Central Cooperative Banks, and Mr Bhutto soon got a fair' 
idea of the immense political power that this entailed for the incumbents. 
The manifesto ofMr Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party, therefore 
understandably included a proposal, inter alia, to reorganise the cooper-
ative banking structure. This fitted well into his programme of promoting 
social justice and redistributing economic opportunities to make them 
more equitable. This proposal was put forth owing to the fact that the 
cooperative societies and banks tended, by and large, to be inequitous in 
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distributing benefits. In fact, they truly replicated the distributional and 
power structures in the society in general and in rural society in particular, 
so that the benefits they distributed were largely monopolised by the 
dominant factions. 
Soon after assuming power as President in December 1971, Mr Bhutto 
brought about the first change in the cooperative banking structure. A 
Presidential order was promulgated on 15 March 197263 which put the 
following important changes into effect: 
(a) All individual members of the Provincial and Central Cooperative 
Banks were expelled. They were reimbursed for the bank shares they held.64 
(b) All members of the managing committees of these Central and Pro-
vincial Banks who had held office for two consecutive terms were removed 
from their positions and became ineligible for re-election for a specified 
period.65 
(c) If the number of members who lost their seats on managing com-
mittees exceeded one third of the total membership of the committee, the 
latter was dissolved and replaced by an administrator appointed by the 
government until a new committee was elected.66 
(d) Persons who were engaged in trade as a profession became ineligible 
to remain or become members of agricultural credit and agricultural 
marketing societies.67 
The Presidential order appears to have been clearly pointed in an 
unmistakable direction. The idea behind it was to overthrow the class 
which had used or misused the cooperative credit institutions as personal 
fiefs to strengthen and underwrite their own dominant role in rural society. 
That this was the intention was confmned by the effect of the order. The 
official who held a key appointment in the cooperatives informed me, 
during a meeting, that in Punjab all of the twenty-nine Central Cooperative 
Banks were affected by the order: all the managing committees were 
dissolved as a result of removal of the old guard. He also said that new 
elections were held amid fierce politicking. As a result, nominees of 
the political party in power gained effective control over the managing 
committees in all the Central Cooperative Banks in Punjab (except Jhelum 
District). 
President Bhutto may have been motivated to take his actions by a 
genuine desire to give cooperative banking a new orientation, but in the 
process he seriously hurt the feudalistic old guard, who had withheld their 
support from him at a time when he asked for and needed it. One cannot 
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help feeling that although it may be simplistic to explain the beginning of a 
certain process in terms of revenge and bitterness, this explanation seems to 
strengthen points (a) and (b) on page 2. However, federalisation came 
fIfty-four months after the old guard had been removed and replaced. 
The key offIcial of the cooperatives was ofthe opinion that the Punjab 
Provincial and Central Cooperative Banks were functioning well and that 
it was the weakness of the Sind cooperative banks which corroborated and 
deserved the criticism of the State Bank. The Sind government was 
unwilling to guarantee the borrowing of its Provincial Cooperative Bank, 
and the State Bank did not fInd the Sind Bank sound enough to be eligible 
for large credits. That this was the case is borne out by Table 4, which 
shows cooperative fInance in Punjab and Sind in 1973-74, i.e. approxi-
Table 4. Comparison of Cooperative Finance in Punjab and Sind Provinces. 1973-74 (in 
millions of Rs) 
Share capital 
Reserves and other funds 
Loans and deposits held 
Credit advanced 













Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan. 1975, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Government of Pakistan, 1981. 
mately the time presently under discussion. It also indicates the relative 
fmancial soundness of cooperative banking in the two provinces. Even 
though this takes us back to hypothesis (b) on page 2, the only - and indeed 
the best - course is to examine the performance of cooperative fInance in 
Punjab and in the other provinces, notably Sind. Table 4, taken together 
with Table 3, highlights the inter-provincial disparities, but it provides no 
further information. 
Table 4 seems to validate the pride which Punjab took in the vigorous 
viability of its Provincial and Central Cooperative Banks. During this 
period, the State Bank (according to what I was told by the key offIcial) 
recommended a merger of the Central Cooperative Banks into the Provin-
cial Cooperative Bank rather than their dissolution. Even a merger was 
considered 'inadvisable' by the provincial government, since it tended to 
undermine the cooperative character of the movement. 
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The legislation for federalisation was sent to all the provinces in order 
to learn their views before it was enforced. The Punjab Cooperatives 
Department opposed the proposed legislation. (I shall not divulge the 
deliberations of the provincial cabinet, since these have a confidential 
status which must be respected.) A Working Paper prepared by the 
Cooperatives Department68 adequately sets out the views of the Depart-
ment, which was the official and specialised agency for developing, 
controlling and managing cooperative institutions. 
The proposed legislation was opposed by the cooperative bureaucracy 
in Punjab on the grounds mentioned below. 
(a) The resolution to authorise the Federal Parliament to regulate and 
legislate on cooperative banking was passed by the Punjab Legislative 
Assembly on 30 March 1976. At that time, a number of members - from all 
of the political parties - were concerned that the cooperative movement 
might come under the control of the federal bureaucracy as a result of the 
proposed law. In response to this concern, the Minister of Finance assured 
these members of the provincial Assembly that the new law would provide 
for 'decentralization and democratization'.69 
(b) The new structure was to 'eliminate 10calleadership'70 and deprive 
most of the people involved in cooperative activities of participating in 
decision-making. 
(c) The new structure would 'retard capital formation at the grass roots '71 
and would be of little help to small farmers. Members of cooperatives who 
had small land holdings would have little say in activities at the level of 
the Provincial Cooperative Bank. 
(d) The proposed structure would allow the Provincial Cooperative Bank 
little freedom to take initiatives vis-a-vis the most vital powers concentrated 
in the Federal Bank. The latter, in formulating policies, might not give due 
consideration to special local and regional requirements. 
(e) The proposed structure did not recognise the inter-provincial differ-
ences in population, in the numbers of cooperatives and of members in 
societies, and in the volume of operations undertaken by these. If these 
were recognised, Punjab would have deserved larger representation on the 
Board of Directors. 
No noticeable modification was made in the proposed law. The 
Provincial Coordination Committee, in its meeting held at Murree on 
28 July 1976, recommended that this legislation be enforced. The Presiden-
tial Ordinance on federalisation was promulgated on October 9 and 
enforced on 19 October 1976. 
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The manner in which the new law was enforced deserves attention. In a 
letter to the government dated 4 October 1976, the Registrar of Cooper-
atives had warned that the dissolution of the Central Cooperative Banks 
could create panic amongst the depositors and the employees of the banks 
and might create a rush for withdrawals of deposits.72 Although this 
possibility was discussed with the Minister, no action was considered 
possible or necessary. 
Officials of the Cooperatives Department were assigned to various 
banks to physically enforce the dissolution and to change the character of 
the Central Cooperative Banks and Banking Unions. Magisterial and 
police assistance was also sought to physically enforce the new system.73 
The task assigned to the officials deputed by the Department amounted to 
a virtual take-over of the banks. Detailed instructions 74 were given to these 
officials to ensure that on the appointed day, all business was closed so as to 
facilitate a new beginning under the new system. Special police guards were 
requested to be present at the banks for fear that depositors might create 
a problem.75 
The dissolution took place on 19 October, and on 29 November 1976 a 
certain percentage of the deposits could be withdrawn from the new 
branches of the Provincial Cooperative Bank. The instructions issued by 
the latter on that date were prepared after a study of the realisable assets 
and liabilities of each Central Cooperative Bank. Depending on the 
viability of each bank, the permissible percentage varied between 0% and 
88%.76 No government guarantee was extended to the depositors under the 
new law, as was done when the commercial banks were nationalised in 
1974. Thus no withdrawals were allowed, nor was any assurance handed 
out to the depositors until one month and eleven days after dissolution. 
Even then, a depositor could withdraw only a specified percentage of his 
total deposit. This percentage was revised from time to time as the amount 
of realisable assets was more clearly evaluated. By January 1977, some of 
the dissolved banks were permitted to pay back their depositors com-
pletely. 
The General Manager of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank in-
formed me, during a discussion in his office in Lahore on 27 July 1982, that 
there were still three banks whose depositors have not yet been paid back. 
All the other Central Cooperative Banks had fully discharged their 
liabilities. The Manager seemed to take considerable pride in this achieve-
ment: according to him, this had been possible only because of the 
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continued confidence of the cooperatives' members, who did not rush to 
the banks, and because of the sound investments in real estate made by the 
dissolved banks during the past flfty years or so. 
The General Manager did, however, complain about the discrimi-
natory government policy, which was inadvertent to the effect that such 
unilateral and abrupt restructuring would have on a popular movement. 
He felt that the government should have guaranteed the discharge of 
liabilities, as it did when the commercial banks were nationalised in 1974. 
He believed that this omission seriously undermined the confidence of the 
people in cooperative institutions. In his opinion it was only the resource-
fulness of the offlcials in the Cooperatives Department, and the deep 
confidence that the members of the cooperatives put in them, that saved the 
structure from collapsing. He felt that the high public standing of the 
offlcial agents in the fleld had rescued the cooperative institutions. (In fact, 
he kept repeating to me that even in those dark days, when no withdrawals 
were possible and deposits were frozen, he was able to attract deposits 
amounting to Rs 0.5 million to his branch; at the time he was Manager of 
the dissolved Multan Central Cooperative Bank which, after federalisa-
tion, had been turned into a branch of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative 
Bank.) 
The Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank, operating through its 
branches, is now the only cooperative bank functioning in the province. It 
is interesting to note that the Federal Bank for Cooperatives is not a 
cooperative institution and was not established under the cooperative law. 
It is a company and was brought into existence through special legislation 
(see page 16). In a certain sense, the three-tier system still exists, so that the 
new structure is in no way simpler or more streamlined. The lines along 
which the cooperative banking structure has been organised, since it was 
enforced on 19 October 1976, are shown in Figure 2. 
The senior cooperative offlcial gave the distinct impression that the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives used its vast powers to cripple the opera-
tional efflciency of the second tier and reduce it to total dependency. Before 
federalisation, the Provincial Cooperative Banks borrowed directly from 
the State Bank and passed on the funds to the Central Cooperative Banks 
for their credit programmes. At present, the Federal Bank borrows from 
the State Bank and adds its own handling and agency charges to the 
lending rate of the latter when it passes on the funds to a Provincial 
Cooperative Bank. The officials in the Cooperatives Department (and many 
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Figure 2. The Cooperative Banking Structure in Pakistan as/rom 19 October 1976 
of those to whom I spoke held senior positions) were convinced that 
federalisation was intended to take away control over cooperative fmance 
from the provinces and concentrate it at the federal level. Such an 
intention has a certain smell of conspiracy, but this could well be a sim-
plistic explanation. Since the provincial cooperative bureaucracy generally 
believed that there was a conspiracy, co-existence and cooperation 
with the Federal Bank was fraught with problems. In the initial years, 
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there was striking unanimity in the disapproval of the new system and in 
the condemnation of the role of the Federal Bank vis-a-vis Punjab province. 
Since the management and operations of cooperative institutions are 
highly 'officialiseo'-,-the-wayine-bureaucracy receives, reacts-ana adapts to 
a new idea largely determines the future usefulness and success of that idea. 
This certainly applies to an idea such as federalisation, which the cooper-
ative bureaucracy in Punjab opposed but stopped resisting when it became 
ajait accompli. However, it was never quite accepted. In the initial years, 
and more specifically during the tenure of the first Managing Director of 
the Federal Bank (i.e. the Banking Advisor whose appointment was refer-
red to on page 21), there was an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, lack 
of understanding and accommodation leading to an unsatisfactory work-
ing relationship. I must emphasise that it is certainly not my intention 
to apportion responsibility for this, but this impression is inescapable. 
Federal control over cooperative banking was thus inaugurated amidst 
an atmosphere charged with mutual distrust, low confidence in the 
movement, apprehension about the future and a sense ofloss among those 
who controlled the dissolved Central Cooperative Banks. Those who 
believed in decision-making at the local level, where cooperative fmance 
was generated, needed and utilised, also shared these feelings. Senior 
officials in the Cooperatives Department were clearly of the opinion that 
this was the true nature of the situation in October 1976. 
4. THE IMPACT OF FEDERALISATION ON RURAL COOPERATIVES 
The restructuring of cooperative banking as a result of federalisation, the 
circumstances leading up to it and the way the change was carried out were 
described in the last section. This background information was sketched in 
order to facilitate a study of the impact of federalisation on rural cooper-
atives. However, two preliminary observations should be made first. 
(a) Through the establishment of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives, 
cooperative banking was brought under the direct control and regulation 
of the federal government for the first time. Until then, the Provincial 
Cooperative Banks were the top tier in the cooperative system, and hence 
most decisions on cooperative credit (except for those slightly restricted by 
limits imposed on loans from the State Bank) were taken at the levels of 
either the Central or the Provincial Cooperative Banks: Federalisation 
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transferred most of this decision-making to the federal level. Previously, 
the Provincial Cooperative Banks provided the vital link between the 
Central Cooperative Banks and the national money and credit markets. 
This link has now been eliminated, since the Provincial Cooperative 
BaWq; are now connected to the national money market through the Federal 
Bank. As far as cooperative credit is concerned, the State Bank now deals 
only through the Federal Bank for Cooperatives. 
(b) The new law did not alter any organisational or operational aspects of 
the primary agricultural cooperative societies, but it drastically restructur-
ed the fmancial institutions on which most operations of these societies 
depended. It is only logical that this would lead to a quantitative orland 
qualitative change in the operations of these societies. 
Let us fIrst examine the trends in cooperative credit before federalisation. 
In order to show the real importance of credit in the rural cooperative 
sector, some fIgures are presented in Table 5 that should demonstrate the 
relative importance to the rural population of the various types of cooper-
. . 
Table 5. Comparative Strengths before and after Federalisation of the Various Types of 
Agricultural Cooperative Societies in Punjab Province 
On 30 June 
1976 




On 30 June 
1981 









Service Development Marketing 
1,923 522 66 
95,456 57,573 4,786 
1,858 468 32 
72,129 47,794 3,358 
Source: For 1976, Annual Report on the Working of Cooperative Societies in the Punjab 
1975-76, Government Press, Lahore, 1979, pp. 7-14. For 1981, Cooperatives in Punjab 
- an Overview, Punjab Cooperatives Department and Punjab Cooperative Union, 
Ferozons, Lahore, 1981, p. 3. 
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atives. The fIrst set of fIgures relates to 1976, which was the year in which 
federalisation occurred. The second set relates to 1981, when the impact of 
federalisation had stabilised and fIrmed up. This comparison of the major 
types of agricultural cooperatives shows-that the numbers aIidrIiember-
ships of all types of societies, except credit societies, has declined since 
federalisation. This suggests that the credit societies continue to serve their 
purpose - i.e. they are still a satisfactory channel for a vital agricultural 
input. One must hasten to add, however, that this is only one possible 
conclusion: another important and possible explanation could be that 
while the number and memberships of the credit societies grew, some of the 
older societies became dormant due to unsound operations and defaults in 
repayments. One should add that this is quite common, and the 
cooperative statutes specifIcally refer to such ailing societies. (The 
classifIcation by the government of societies in terms of their fmancial 
strength dates back to the 1920s.) 
The fInancial viability of societies is thus an important part of each 
annual report on the cooperatives. The 12,658 credit societies that were in 
existence on 30 June 1976 could be broken down into six classes as follows. 77 
- Class A societies, which could function independently 
and had never defaulted on repayments; these societies 
could approach cooperative banks directly without 
departmental recommendations: 
- Class B societies, which were short of funds and had 
defaulted to the extent that less than 33% of their mem-
bers were in debt; these societies had not paid interest or 
principal for 12-24 months: 
- Class C societies, which had defaulted on repayments 
but were capable of maintaining accounts and recovering 
loans and were generally sound: 
- Class D societies, which were dormant after defaulting 
on repayments for at least three years and were not 
eligible to receive further loans: 
- New societies which had been operating for less than 
a year and therefore were not classifIed: 










Another comparison which helps to identify trends and supplements the 
data in Table 5 is a comparison of the volume of cooperative credit from 
year to year before and after federalisation. Table 6 shows the cooperative 
credit disbursed in the agricultural sector three years before and three years 
after federalisation. 
Table 6. Cooperative Agricultural Credit: a Comparison of the Volume before and after 














* Includes special federal funds for repairing damage done by floods. 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan. 1980, pp. l37-l38. 
Trends in Cooperative Agricultural Credit 
As is shown by Table 6, the volume of cooperative credit has consistently 
increased over the years, but it would be too hasty to conclude that this is 
solely attributable to the federalisation of cooperative banking. It is 
important that one should also look at the government policies on 
agriculture and agricultural credit. In section 1, some basic statistics were 
provided to show the importance of agriculture for Pakistan's economy. 
Agricultural development is also important for producing sufficient food 
grains for the growing popUlation and for boosting exports, since Pakistan 
is essentially an exporter of primary products. Table 7 is highly illustrative 
of how the credit policy works. 
Table 8 shows the cooperative performance of the three main credit 
agencies in Punjab province and also shows how this compares with credit 
disbursement in other provinces. It is clear from this table that the Federal 
Bank for Cooperatives participated very significantly in credit disburse-
ment in Punjab. Production loans were short term and were advanced for 
purchasing inputs. In fact, 94.24% of the Federal Bank's total lending for 
production purposes was disbursed in Punjab province, while only 5.76% 
was disbursed in all the other provinces. It is also obvious from Table 8 that 
the commercial banks, and more specifically the Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), have assumed responsibility for providing 
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Table 7. Shares of the Agricultural Credit Agencies in Total Loans, 1955/1980-81 (in 
millions of Rs) 
Years ADBP* Cooperative banks Commercial banks 
Period Period Period Total 
average % average % average % 
1955-60 7.35 32.00 52.00 
1960-65 40.30 31 72.00 56 128.00 
1965-70 89.62 55 59.00 36 164.00 
1970-75 230.46 46 73.00 14 179.00 36 504.00 
1975-80 545.68 29 290.00 16 1,206.00 65 1,855.00 
1979-80 711.55 24 708.64 23 1,580.00 53 3,008.97 
1980-81 1,066.00 27 1,127.00 28 1,800.00 45 4,003.23 
* Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 1980-81 and State Bank of Pakistan, produced in S.H. 
Pasha, 'Agricultural Credit - a Detailed Survey', in Journal of Pakistan 
Administrative Staff College (Lahore) XIX (Jan.-June 1982), p. 58. 
development credit. It is interesting to note that 72.18% of the productiOn 
loans from all the banks was advanced in Punjab, while 61.75% of the 
development loans was disbursed in this province. It is worth noting that 
Sind, which is the next largest recipient of credit from these banks, got 
9.36% of the total production credit and 21.34% of the total development 
Table 8. Disbursement of Agricultural Credit in Punjab, 1980-81 (in millions of Rs)* 
Production loans 
(% of total) 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives 1,048.58 
(94.24) 










* The fourth source of agricultural credit - direct government loans - has not been shown 
owing to its nominal volume. 
Source: Pasha, 'Agricultural Credit .. .', pp. 60-61. 
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credit.78 This very seriously weakens point (b) on page 2. Table 9 further 
weakens point (b) by showing the importance of Punjab for the credit 
agencies. 
Table 9. Distribution of Agricultural Credit among Provinces, 1980-81 (in millions of Rs) 
1980-81 Punjab Sind NWFP* Baluchistan Total 
Production 1,414.89 383.44 139.83 22.16 1,900.22 
Development 760.47 261.54 188.21 21.17 1,231.39 
Total loans 2,175.36 644.98 328.04 43.33 3,191.71 
(%) (68.16) (20.21) (10.28) (1.36) (100) 
* Northwestern Frontier Province. 
Source: Pasha,' Agricultural Credit ... ', p. 62. 
The prominent features of agricultural credit can only be discussed 
briefly here, but they have to be mentioned because the expansion of 
agricultural credit and the policy behind that expansion is the dynamic 
framework within which cooperative credit has developed. The latter 
directly depends on the credit policy followed by the governnient since 
1976. The prominent features of agricultural credit are listed below. 
(a) Such credit has expanded at a tremendous rate in all four provinces 
in Pakistan, which is indicative of a deliberate government policy of credit 
expansion. 
(b) The two earliest institutional arrangements made by the government 
for this expansion were the establishment of the AD BP and the initiation of 
commercial banks into the agricultural credit system in 1972-73. 
(c) The third institutional arrangement was'the setting up of the Federal 
Bank for Cooperatives, which meant that the cooperative sector was also 
merged into the agricultural credit market. This market is now directly 
controlled and regulated by the federal governml:nt. 
(d) The formulation of agricultural-credit policy was no longer ad hoc 
but became deliberate and comprehensive. In 1972, a National Consultative 
Credit Council was established and was given very considerable powers. 
The Council is chaired by the Governor of the State Bank, and it advises 
the government on 'credit expansion within safe limits' and sets specific 
targets for agricultural loans. 79 The Agricultural Credit Advisory Commit-
tee of the Council is also chaired by the Governor of the State Bank, and 
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this is what gives the Committee its importance. The Committee comprises 
federal and provincial experts, representatives of credit agencies and 
agricultirusts.80 
(e) The State Bank has special lending rates designed to encourage 
investments in agriculture; Lower rates of interest make operations using 
agricultural credit attractive for the credit agencies and also offer 
advantageous concessions for agriculturists. To ensure that targets are 
achieved, the State Bank requires a special interest-free deposit equivalent 
to the shortfall of a bank when it defaults in achieving its mandatory 
target.81 
(f) The major objectives of the agricultural-credit policy continue to be:82 
reaching a larger percentage of the farmers; increasing the availability of 
credit for small farmers; simplifying procedures, making credit more 
economical and ensuring that it is used to raise productivity; and 
revitalising cooperative credit. 
(g) During 1979-80, the federal government decided to advance interest-
free credit to small farmers in order to increase production. The volume of 
such loans has become sizeable: the Federal Bank for Cooperatives alone 
advanced Rs 816,670,000 free of interest during 1980-81, compared to 
Rs 461,650,000 in the preceding year.83 
Within the framework of the National Agricultural Credit Policy, Punjab 
province is the foremost beneficiary because it has such a large agricultural 
. sector. Table 9 shows its massive share in the total credit advanced in the 
agricultural sector. One pornt that I hope to have put across by presenting 
the data and discussion in this paper is that the national monetary policy 
has consistently been one of expanding agricultural credit. The data also 
shows that all along, Punjab has received by far the largest share of that 
ever-expanding credit, and that the Federal Bank for Cooperatives is only 
one of the three most important sources of institutional agricultural credit. 
The volume of agricultural credit coming from all three agencies has clearly 
increased. 
In the years preceding federalisation (1970-75), the average annual 
credit disbursement in the cooperative sector was 14% of the average 
annual credit disbursed by all agencies. It is worth noting that this share of 
the total was as high as 85% during 1950-53, 56% during 1960-65 and 36% 
during 1965-70.84 After federalisation, the trend in the figures for this share 
was as follows: 85 
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1975-80: 16% of the total 
1979-80: 23% " " " 
1980-81: 28% " " " 
Thus is is clear that in Pakistan, cooperative credit has steadily 
increased in absolute and relative terms since 1975-76. This steady increase 
coincides very closely with federalisation, but it should be seen in the total 
context of agricultural credit and not in isolation. It would be too 
hypothetical te presume or argue that the situation would be different if the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives had not been established, or if the old 
structure of cooperative banking had not risen to the demands of the 
national credit policies had it been allowed to continue. Either presump-
tion would be difficult to substantiate, especially since cooperative banking 
is only one part of a larger whole which was being propelled upwards by a 
tremendous boost from the government. This seems to strengthen the 
hypothesis (see point [d] on page 2) that the motivation behind federalisa-
tion was development. 
Local and Centralised Banking for Rural Cooperatives 
Under the Presidential order issued on 15 March 1972 (referred to on page 
22), all individual members of secondary cooperative societies were 
excluded from membership. As a result, even before 1976 only societies 
-and not individuals - were affIliated with the Central and Provincial 
Cooperative Banks. Thus since 1972, cooperative agricultural credit has 
been disbursed only among societies. It is the growing number of 
agricultural cooperative societies that has benefitted from the expansion of 
credit. It appears that since federalisation, the agricultural cooperative 
societies have had much better access to credit than before. One has, 
nevertheless, little basis for suggesting that this is solely or mostly due to 
federalisation. The discussion which is to follow will shed some light on this 
point. 
Let us now consider whether the new structure of cooperative banking 
was superior to the old one. One good way of analysing the new situation is 
to elicit the views of those who have worked with both structures. My aim 
here is to analyse this in conjunction with my own personal appraisal of the 
extent to which the new system is organisationally more suitable for 
achieving its objectives. I had the opportunity to have long discussions, on 
29 and 31 July, with the Vice-President of the Punjab Provincial 
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Cooperative Bank, who holds the highest office available in the Provincial 
Cooperative Bank to a member of the cooperative movement who is not a 
government official. Given his position his views deserve serious considera-
tion. 
Before discussing the Vice-President's views, it may be useful to briefly 
describe his background. First, one should mention that he is highly typical 
of the class that dominates cooperatives in Punjab province and that had 
controlled the Central Cooperative Banks when these existed. His record is 
strikingly similar to those of countless others in Punjab. He is a scion of a 
prominent and influential rural family. His father was President of a 
Central Cooperative Bank from 1950 to 1972, when the Presidential order 
placed limits on tenures and he had to step down. He himself was elected 
President in his father's place and continued in this position until the 
Central Cooperative Banks were dissolved in 1976. He was elected Vice-
President of the Provincial Cooperative Bank of Punjab in 1978. Since he is 
required by law (an Order issued in 1972) to step down for three years after 
two terms, he has planned to have a close relative to step in while he waits 
for the three years to pass before he can return to his old job. He is as 
confident of his own re-election as he is of the election of anyone else he 
sponsors. His past performance seems to show that this confidence is not 
undue. He enjoys solid support from influential members of cooperatives 
who will rally behind him when called upon, as they did for his father. The 
solidarity of his faction, which is based on common interests, is the best 
guarantee of its dominance, as experience over the last thirty years has 
shown. 
Such are the loyalties and affiliations of the class that dominates 
cooperative activities in Punjab. These have been built up deliberately and 
consciously - through a series of good turns and politicking - to cultivate, 
consolidate and retain permanent support. All the districts in Punjab, and 
their subdivisions, have comparable stalwarts who have dominated the 
cooperative scene from the start. The management is either directly in their 
hands, or it is with by other members of their group. To discuss these 
loyalties further one would have to present basic facts about the power and 
class structure in rural society in Punjab, as this is the only way to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of a phenomenon such as the personality 
described here. 
On 31 July, while in the Vice-President's office, I met an old gentleman 
who had been involved in cooperative activities for many years. He said 
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that he had been Director and Vice-President of a Central Cooperative 
Bank from 1940 to 1972 and that he was also appointed Director of the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives for a three-year term. He regretted that the 
bureaucracy 'disliked' his candid views and explained that this was why he 
was out of office at the time. One need not go into the relationship between 
cooperatives and politics, since in Punjab these go hand in hand: the one is 
the means, and the other the end and vice versa. 
In my discussions with the Vice-President, two points were discussed 
primarily. The ftrst was what the objective offederalisation was and what 
effect this has had on cooperative societies. The second was what 
advantages the present system offers and how it compares with the earlier 
structure in terms of usefulness to cooperative societies. The Vice-
President's views are listed below, and they were generally shared by the 
former Director of the Federal Bank. 
(a) Mr Bhutto wanted to gain complete control over the patronage that 
could be exercised through cooperative banking. He was keen on building 
up and strengthening his support in the countryside. Cooperative banking 
was a very effective source of rural credit that had a well-developed and 
elaborate infrastructure in the rural areas. The potential for helping the 
members of his party, and for attracting others through use of cooperative 
ftnance, was promising. In other words, the cooperative fmancial institu-
tions were dissolved (and replaced by a new and a different system) in order 
to use the new system to generate political support for the regime. Hence, 
the decision to dissolve these institutions was predominantly political 
rather than economic or developmental. There was, however, also a 
punitive element inherent in it: Mr Bhutto resented those who had opposed 
him or had refused to support him in his struggle for power. He was not 
willing to let them continue to control institutions of such political 
importance. 
(b) The effect of federalisation on cooperative societies has been mostly 
qualitative. As far as the availability of credit goes, this has increased 
greatly since the establishment of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives. In 
fact, there is so much pressure to meet mandatory credit targets that the 
entire official cooperative structure strives to meet them at all costs, even if 
this involves making compromises about the security of loans. Because 
achieving targets is the foremost consideration, other economic and 
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banking considerations are neglected. Since federalisation, the cooperative 
societies have done remarkably well in terms of credit absorption (as 
distinct from the proper utilisation of credit). 
According to theVice-President's cauti()us estirn:ate,-ab()ut 30% ofthe-
cooperative societies in Punjab were 'one-man societies'. This irn:plies that 
one person, or a group of two or three members, would monopolise the 
benefits accruing to the society. Other members were only names on paper 
which were provided to meet procedural requirements. The former 
Director thought that the number of such societies was as high at 90% of 
the total. Both men thought that such societies had flourished since 
federalisation, because the post-federalisation system was remarkably 
conducive to the proliferation of such societies. 
Although figures on the non-agricultural operations of the Federal 
Bank for Cooperatives are not readily available, it is known that its 
operations are primarily agricultural. From the beginning, the policy of the 
Board of Directors of the Bank has been to discourage non-agricultural 
operations, and the Bank has focussed its resources on the agricultural 
sector. The Chief Auditor of cooperatives, during a discussion in his office 
on 31 July, informed me that even the viable industrial units run by 
cooperatives have to tum to commercial banks in order to meet their 
financial requirements, and the Federal Bank refuses to commit funds even 
to profitable and safe industrial operations of cooperatives. 
(c) From a purely economic standpoint, federalisation was a sound 
decision, even though it was not necessary to dissolve the Central 
Cooperative Banks. These could have been retained, and in so doing the 
local character of these fmancial institutions would not have been lost to 
the cooperative movement. By integrating cooperative banking into the 
national credit market, the former has been exposed to modem banking 
practices and procedures. Until this occurred, cooperative banking had 
functioned in isolation, i.e. there was little outside control or supervision 
applied by the State Bank, and it still retained its early twentieth-century 
character. In this sense, it was in no way suited to the modem tirn:es, and the 
Provincial and Central Cooperative Bank officials, despite their practical 
experience, were less than half-educated as to what modem banking is. 
This is still the case, since it was not possible to remove most of the higher 
staff without causing human hardship and relocating jobs, and at the same 
tirn:e the pressure to extend loans needed for cultivating crops continued. 
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There was a complete lack of harmony and cooperation between the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives and the cooperative bureaucracy in 
Punjab. The fIrst Managing Director of the Federal Bank had serious 
difficulties because of the hostility and suspicion among the Punjab 
bureaucrats, and the Federal Bank was reduced to a state of helplessness 
with the result that none of its resolutions were allowed to be implemented 
in Punjab. The Bank wanted the local branch managers to participate more 
actively in arranging loans, but its efforts were blunted by the Punjab 
bureaucracy. The Bank laid down a new loaning procedure in order to 
bring the existing procedure somewhat in line with the requirements for 
adequately ensuring the security of loans. To date, this has not been 
enforced, because the Punjab bureaucracy considers the procedure too 
cumbersome. 
The Vice-President of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank 
supplied me with a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bank 
for Cooperatives on 11 September 1978 on the 'Inspection Report of 
Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Limited'. The memorandum lists 
various examples of the lack of a working relationship between these two 
institutions, both of which are important for cooperative [mance. The 
memorandum states (on page 1) that 'The inspection was started on 24th 
February 1978. Its progress remained slow because of the unwilling 
attitude of the staff in furnishing books, records and other information 
required for completing inspection.' 
The memorandum also mentions instances of mismanagement, un-
sound investments, poor record-keeping and unsatisfactory banking 
procedures, despite the fact that the Federal Bank had repeatedly given 
advice on these points. The Bank expressed its regret (on page 12) that the 
Provincial Cooperative Bank 'does not have a team of qualifIed and 
competent offIcers at his Head OffIce, most of the Zonal OffIces and the 
branches. The staff has miserably failed to reorganise any aspect of the 
Bank, be it administration, accounts, personnel, branches, loaning or any 
other important portfolio.' 
I also had the opportunity to study a note86 prepared by the Punjab 
Cooperatives Department and intended to record a history of excesses on 
the part of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives against the Punjab 
Provincial Cooperative Bank. In concluding, the note observes that 'the 
Managing Director (of the Federal Bank) perhaps has some old grudge and 
is out to destroy the entire cooperative movement in the Punjab. The note 
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reads essentially as a denunciation of the Managing Director of the Federal 
Banle 
The mention of these two official documents here is intended to emphasise 
the nature· and extent of the· confrontation between the ·cooperative 
bureaucracy in Punjab and the Federal Bank - or, more specifically, its 
Managing Director. Its intensity remained unabated until the fIrst 
Managing Director completed his tenure and left office in 1981. The result 
of this confrontation was a reduction in operational efficiency of both 
institutions, which meant that they would not offer their best services to 
their clients, the cooperative (i.e. primary) societies. Ultimately, it was these 
societies which suffered the consequences: at least their benefIts were 
reduced by the squabbles between the two institutions. 
The Vice-President felt that the local character of the dissolved Central 
Cooperative Banks was lost when these banks became branches of the 
Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank. The bye-laws of the Provincial Bank 
provide (in sections 43 and 44) for a District Advisory Committee, the 
membership ~f which are largely appointed, but its advisory role is very 
loosely expressed in respect of the branches in its district. It is in no wayan 
adequate substitute for efficient management by the locally elected 
managing committees which were dissolved when the Central Cooperative 
Banks were dissolved. These committees, which comprised leading 
members of local cooperatives, not only exercised power effectively in 
relation to banking operations but were deeply familiar with local 
conditions and requirements; they had little need to rely on bureaucratic 
decisions, as unfortunately is now the case. 
(d) The Vice-President sketched a pessimistic scenario of the present role 
of bureaucrats in the cooperative movement. He complained of mal-
practices in most operations and felt that federalisation had enhanced the 
incidence of malpractice and bureaucratic excesses. Because management 
powers were passed from the locally elected members of cooperatives (i.e. 
in practice the cooperative elite) to the cooperative bureaucracy, loan 
operations have come to depend on whether bureaucratic discretion is 
exercised, rather than on local knowledge about eligibility for loans, the 
genuineness of the need, the performance of the cooperative society etc. At 
present, whether or not a loan will be granted depends largely on the 
indulgence ofthe local cooperative bureaucracy. 
The maximum credit limit that is sanctioned, on application for a loan, 
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by the Inspector of Cooperatives or Assistant Registrar is Rs 100,000. This 
sanction is presented to the local branch Manager, who does nothing more 
than issue a bank draft. This is brought to the supplier of the agricultural in-
put required by the society. Beyond this procedure, the branch Manager has 
no ro1e in the loaning operation, and he bears no responsibility for recovery. 
The field staff of the Cooperatives Department are fully aware of the status 
of the cooperative societies and especially of these 'one:-man societies'. 
The Vice-President observed that in Punjab, many traders in agri-
cultural inputs are in business because the inputs originally supplied to 
cooperatives on credit are commonly sold to the traders at very favourable 
rates. Fertiliser, for instance, is supplied to the cooperatives at special 
reduced rates. The trader, when retailing such fertiliser, is confident of 
making a sizeable profit, but while this fertiliser is recorded as being 
supplied on credit in the cooperative sector, it is in fact used outside it. The 
credit disbursed in kind is thus converted into cash and unproductively 
used to purchase cars or fmance marriages etc. The Vice-President thought 
that cooperative credit was commonly being utilised outside the sector 
because there is little popular participation and control. Petty cooperative 
officials were being used by local traders who were keen to earn easy money 
and had no qualms about the propriety of their means. In this way, 
cooperative loan operations have come to be used for personal aggrand-
isement. The Vice-President was bitter about this situation, because the 
members of cooperatives were helpless owing to the high degree of 
bureaucratisation in the system. 
Another example of how the bureaucracy appeared to be misusing the 
system by twisting facts and distorting statistics was the recovery of loans. 
Since 1977, only one crop has had a low recovery rate, of76.06%, on credit 
advanced. For the remaining seven crops, the recovery rates for that period 
varied between 93.27% to 96.88%.87 The recovery rate on loans advanced 
in Punjab by commercial banks in the farming sector in 1982 was as low as 
32%!88 During 1973-74 and 1974-75, the recovery rates for cooperative 
loans in the agricultural sector were 30.02% and 34.11 % respectively. 89 
During 1972-73 the rate was 35.89%.90 It was 30.5% and 31.8% during 
1971-72 and 1970-71 respectively.91 In 1975, the last year before federalisa-
tion, the rate of recovery was no more than 35.37%. 
It is clear that between 1970-71 and 1974-75, the recovery rates for 
cooperative loans in the agricultural sector varied between 30.02% and 
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35.89%. The question arises of how they jumped to a rate steadily above 
90% in two years, when such other loaning agencies as commercial banks 
were still struggling at 32%. (While I was an executive officer in the field 
between 1978 and 1981, I am not aware orany special efforts by the 
cooperatives to recover their loans.) 
The ADBP and the commercial banks had made far more elaborate 
arrangements for recovering loans. They paid the provincial government 
to appoint special recovery staff and to give them major incentives and 
organisational support. In comparison, the cooperative banks' efforts pale . 
into insignificance. This situation intrigued me, the more so because I was 
not getting direct answers to my queries. 
It is not my intention here to belittle the efforts by the Cooperatives 
Department to step up recovery rates. One need not doubt that these 
efforts were well meant and comprehensive, yet one has to close one's eyes 
to the hard realities of the rural situation if one is to believe that the 
improvements in efforts to recover loans could make a difference of nearly 
300% in a matter of months. 
I learnt later, on the authority of the Vice-President, that this situation 
could be quite easily explained. The funds for loans were received from the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives in addition to the Provincial Cooperative 
Bank's own resources. A target for recovery had already been fixed, and to 
achieve this the defaulting societies were sanctioned another loan, but 
instead of actually disbursing it this was diverted and reflected under 
recoveries. The Vice-President revealed that sometimes a part of the funds 
received from the Federal Bank was returned after a few days and recorded 
as recoveries on,previous loans. Thus every year, a cooperative credit was 
shown as disbursed, but actually it was only disbursed on paper, and in fact 
it was used to payoff outstanding loans to the Federal Bank. The Vice-
President felt that such manipulations were characteristic of the bureau-
cratic way of functioning. The bureaucrats employed these devious 
machinations without reluctance, simply to show that the cooperatives 
were consistently doing better than before. 
Previously, the cooperative bureaucracy did not have such direct 
control over cooperative banking, and the Central Cooperative Banks had 
consiqerable operational independence. At present,the Cooperatives 
Department is directly responsible for the performance of cooperative 
banking. The Vice-President suggested that the bureaucracy cannot afford 
to let it be known that their performance is less outstanding than that of the 
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privately run cooperative banking system, which, at least to the extent that 
it had its own resources, acted independently. The new system makes no 
allowance for such a possibility, and the operations of rural cooperatives 
depend on that system. 
The views of the Vice-President seem cynical, but it must be kept in 
mind that he has by no means lost everything owing to the initiation of the 
new system. As long as he retains his position (which will be for ten or 
fIfteen years, according to him), there will be a place for him in the present 
system. The rest - and most - of the former 'heavyweights' in cooperative 
banking have found positions on advisory committees in the districts and 
are mostly concentrated at the level of the primary societies. The question 
arises of whether they are acting as spearheads for the malpractices 
discussed above, and it is diffIcult to get an authoritative answer on this 
issue. This is because the bureaucracy will not admit to or substantiate the 
malpractices in a system controlled by itself. If one were to make a direct 
probe on one's own, which would involve bypassing the bureaucratic 
set-up, the inquiry would have to be carried out at the village level and 
hence would be a huge task. This question will therefore have to remain 
unanswered. However, given the power structure and strong factional 
commitments, it would not be unreasonable to assume that those 
exercising power could still be claiming a disproportionately large share of 
the benefIts emanating from the expanding [mance. One indication of this 
is the difference in recovery rates before and after tederalisation. This may 
largely represent the disguised benefIts accruing to the powerful factions 
under the new system. The ends may have undergone little change, but the 
means were bound to undergo changes with the restructuring of the formal 
institutions. 
Conclusions 
The discussion presented here and the conversations with individuals with 
long and meaningful associations with cooperatives, either as government 
offIcials or as members of cooperatives, lead one to arrive at the following 
conclusions on the federalisation of cooperative banking in Pakistan. 
Cooperatives and the Rural Elite. - The cooperative movement was started 
by the British in order to relieve the problems of the debt-ridden peasantry. 
The colonial administration governed the countryside through the active 
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help of the rural elite. Without this solid support, a handful of British and 
native officers could not have dreamt of governing a country so vast as 
India. The support of the elite was inevitably sought for all government 
programmes and was rarely denied, be it for rural re-construction, control 
of rural crime, a Viceroy's Relief Fund or a contribution to a war effort. In 
order to be successful in rural areas, the cooperatives had to have the 
support of the elite. In the course of time, the advantages accruing to this 
class from the cooperative movement, and the support which that class had 
initially given it, came to be justified because the government had decided 
to popularise the movement, and hence there was a gradual take-over by 
the rural elite. 
The rural power structure has obvious imbalances, as does the national 
one. Cooperative institutions were therefore monopolised by the elite. The 
financial institutions were sources of massive patronage, in addition to 
being fmancially rewarding for those who controlled them. In cooperative 
institutions other than banks, the privileged class was able to claim and 
usurp what was due to the less privileged classes, and the socio-economic 
system facilitated this process. 
Cooperatives and the Bureaucracy. The cooperative movement was 
initiated under close government supervision. The rural population was 
not considered sufficiently motivated or capable to organise and manage 
modem cooperatives independent of the government. This led to the 
movement being run by government officials. The bureaucratic organisa-
tion, therefore, expanded rapidly over the years. The number of coop-
erative societies grew nevertheless, and so did their memberships. All 
along, progress was computed in numerical terms, and in the official 
estimates the development of the cooperative movement was seen as 
synonymous with the growth in the number of societies. From a typically 
bureaucratic viewpoint, the increases in the number of societies, in the 
memberships and in the volume of fmancial operations were considered 
adequate measures of the development of the cooperative movement. 
There is nothing that I observed or heard from veterans in the cooperative 
movement that even vaguely suggested that a distinction was seen between 
the two. 
Given this scheme of things, every field officer in the cooperative 
bureaucracy had to ensure that the number of societies, the volume of 
financial operations etc. progressively increased, since any decrease would 
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have to be explained. No connection was drawn between organising new 
cooperative societies on the one hand and the need for cooperative 
education and for motivating people to cooperate on the other. Between 
1978-79 and 1979-80, 10,314 new societies were registered, which meant an 
increase in the number of societies of 41.59% within a year.92 This 
campaign was launched to introduce cooperatives in every village of the 
province, but the important fact to note here is that cooperative education 
and motivating people to cooperate were not a part of this campaign.93 It 
was carried out as a typically administrative task that had to be accom-
plished within a specified period of time. 
The point to be emphasised here is that by and large, there is a well 
organised and large bureaucratic machinery at the forefront, while the 
movement itself is tucked away in the background. From the beginning, 
the role of the bureaucracy has been dominant, and the bureaucracy has 
always 'administered' the cooperatives. There is an obvious conceptual 
contradiction inherent in this situation, and it is difficult to see how it can 
be reconciled. One· cannot help feeling that bureaucratisation has been 
carried too. far to allow a pop:ular and voluntary movement to function and 
grow as such. 
It would be difficult to say that cooperative banking was popularly run. 
The managers were not government officials, but control was concentrated 
among a handful of prominent families. It would be erroneous, therefore, 
to consider the managements of the dissolved Central Cooperative Banks 
as even remotely popular. What was certainly true is that these manage-
ments were more susceptible to popular pressures and more alive to local 
situations, and the bureaucracy in Pakistan cannot be credited with such 
responsiveness. In fact, this is the most common criticism of the 
bureaucracy, whether it be in the cooperative sector or any other sector. 
It is obvious from the discussion in sections .2 and 3 that the new 
banking structure is highly bureaucratised. The bureaucracy cannot 
function if the cooperative societies do not exist, and the latter have not 
been allowed to function without the former since 1904. Therefore, a 
working relationship has been forged between the two not so much in the 
interest of the cooperative movement but in order to continue a system 
which offers some advantages for both in terms of finance and employ-
ment. 
There was indignation among leading members of the cooperatives, 
and particularly the elite, about federalisation because the banks which 
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they controlled were dissolved. Furthermore, there were no other oppor-
tunities for them to exercise authority in the new banking structure. The 
cooperative bureaucracy was hostile because the new law seemed to 
transfer power but of Punjab proVince and -t<:i- the-Federal BanJcfor 
Cooperatives. The cooperative bureaucracy consolidated their control 
over the new system by insisting that provincial interests be protected and 
by severely criticising the Federal Bank for its hostility towards the 
cooperative movement in Punjab and for asserting its authority in an area 
of which the fullest knowledge was available only with the provincial 
bureaucracy. 
There were, of course, allegations and countercharges, but the simple 
truth appears to be that the Federal Bank for Cooperatives was 
endeavouring to enter a new field, and since the cooperative bureaucracy 
was already well entrenched in that field it was unwilling to let its authority 
slip through its [rogers. The only serious defect in the new system was that 
the local character of cooperative banking was lost. It is true that the 
managers, though selected locally, tended to be predominantly from the 
socially and economically powerful rural families. The new situation did 
not remedy this problem, but it did eliminate and replace it with 
bureaucratised control. It is also true that the grip of the elite on the 
cooperatives could only be broken by transforming the overall rural power 
structure. Yet, such measures as the legislation passed in 1972 and 1976 
were able to go a long way in diminishing the elite's control and creating 
conditions for participation by the rank-and-fIle in the cooperatives. The 
new structure offers few possibilities for effective participation by those 
who are not government officials. It appears unlikely, therefore, that a 
structure that is intensely bureaucratised at the top would contribute to the 
growth of the popular, participative and voluntary organisations under its 
aegis. It is not surprising that there were opportunities for establishing 
'one-man societies' and other instances of misuses of cooperative re-
sources. 
Why Was Cooperative Banking Federalised? - By 1973, Mr Bhutto had 
succeeded in installing his own supporters on the managing committees of 
almost all the Central Cooperative Banks. Thus, he had exercised 
patronage and could continue to exercise it through the members of his 
party who occupied key positions in these banks. The problem of gathering 
support was, therefore, no longer an issue in 1976: if it was revenge that Mr 
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Bhutto sought to take on the elite, he had more than wreaked it. It appears 
highly improbable that there were any significant emotional considerations 
behind the federalisation of cooperative banking (see points [a] and [c] on 
page 2). 
What seems more reasonable is that Mr Bhutto was aiming at an 
extensive accrual of the benefits emanating from cooperative credit. He 
had received massive support from the peasantry in the elections and took 
great pride in having the broadly based support of the poor. The elite 
supported him after his initial successes, but he alwl+Ys preferred to be 
identified with the less privileged. The truth of this statement is emphasised 
by his decision to induct commercial banking into the agricultural-credit 
system in 1973. There are clear indications that he wanted to rapidly 
expand the volume of agricultural credit with a definite bias towards 
helping the small farmers. Before 1976, cooperative banking was not 
closely integrated into national agricultural-credit operations. After the 
nationalisation of commercial banks in 1974, the cooperative banking 
system 'stuck out like a sore thumb' as far as those who planned and 
implemented the agricultural-credit policies were concerned. It therefore 
had to be made a part of the government machine in order to make it more 
responsive to official policies on agricultural credit (see point [d] on page 
2). 
It seems highly unfair to make federalisation look as if it were a 
conspiracy against Punjab province. The statistics and discussions pre-
sented in section 3 clearly demonstrate that Punjab continues to absorb a 
very large proportion of the total ,credit in the cooperative sector. Despite 
the serious problems which the Punjab bureaucracy has faced in working 
with the Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Punjab continues to be the major 
recipient of cooperative agricultural credit (see point [b] on page 2.). 
Rural Cooperation Under the New Banking System. - Cooperative credit in 
the agricultural sector in Punjab expanded abruptly from Rs 38,690,000 
for the summer ('KHARIF') crop in 1978 to Rs 364,530,00094 for the same 
crop in 1981. Obviously, it was the rural cooperative societies that 
benefitted from this credit. The number of cooperative societies (including 
all types) also rose during this period, from 22,289 to 41,037.95 The trend in 
membership was roughly the same. Quantitatively,the cooperative socie-
ties in the rural areas should therefore have been providing vastly more 
efficient services to their members since federalisation. However, as was 
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already mentioned, it is difficult to attribute the expansion in cooperative 
credit to federalisation. 
The cooperative movement as such has, in my judgement, apparently 
suffered a qualitative setback since federalisation. There is little basis-for 
lauding the cooperative character of the societies before federalisation. It is 
no secret that their character was hardly that of a cooperative and that the 
distribution of benefits was inequitous. As far as the primary societies were 
concerned, federalisation brought no organisational or operational 
changes. In banking, the elitist character of management was eliminated by 
dissolving the local (i.e. Central Cooperative) banks. 
Decision-making at the level of the Provincial Cooperative Banks and 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives has become overwhelmingly bureau-
cratised. Bureaucracy tends to strongly identify, with and lean towards the 
dominant interests in society. Direct l:mreaucratic control over the new 
institutions for cooperative fmance has rendereq the cooperative societies, 
their development and their operations clearly subordinate to the policies 
of the Federal Bank, which fmances their operations. The government has 
pursued a deliberate policy of expanding the cooperative sector with a view 
to stepping up the use of modern agricultural inputs, but without backing 
this up with corresponding educational and motivational programmes. 
This has led to serious inadequacies in the cooperative societies. The fact 
that a certain number of persons have joined together, or that they are 
shown in official records as'having formed a cooperative society, is by no 
means sufficient to indicate the presence of the spirit of cooperation. The 
fact that the bureaucracy dominates and controls all operations - from 
registration to liquidation - detracts seriously from the cooperative spirit. 
The cooperatives are being used primarily as vehicles for extending the 
use of modern agricultural inputs and for agricultural development. There 
is no evidence suggesting that the government is keen on giving any other 
role to the rural cooperatives. The new banking system assists the 
government in promoting whatever function it chooses for the coopera-
tives (see hypothesis [d] on page 2). 
One cannot help concluding that the new banking system has 
completed the process of spreading bureaucratic control over all aspects of 
the rural cooperatives, which is leading to further qualitative deterioration 
in what should be described as 'cooperation'. A distinction must, however, 
be made between the expansion of cooperation as a movement and the 
huge infusion of agricultural credit through the official and officially 
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controlled infrastructure - an infrastructure which can be aptly described 
as 'cooperative organisation' and which is quite distinct from the 
institutions in a 'cooperative movement'. Whatever rural 'cooperative 
movement' had survived seventy-two years of growing bureaucratisation 
was administered a rude shock by federalisation. As a result of the 
federalisation of its fmance, the cooperative movement lost more ground 
to official organisation than it lost during all the earlier crises and setbacks. 
Return to the Hypotheses. - Throughout the latter part of this paper, 
references have been made to the four hypotheses set out on page 2. While 
Mr Bhutto may originally have been driven by a desire to seek vengeance, 
this should have been satisfied by the legislation which became effective in 
1972. Thereafter, the veteran elite transferred their support to him, and he 
had placed supporters of his own party on the managing committees of the 
Central Cooperative Banks. Furthermore, the statistics presented in 
sectiori 3 demonstrate that Punjab province continued to receive the largest 
share of the' benefits of the cooperative credit programmes. Thus, there is 
little ground for supporting the theory that there were provincial 
preferences. The fourth hypothesis appears to come closest to the real 
objectives of the government. The points discussed in the previous 
, subsection strengthen this impression, but they do not detract from the 
validity of what has been said in this section. They also do not in any way 
reflect the degree and intensity of the bureaucratisation of cooperative 
institutions, and in particular of the fmancial institutions. 
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